Role of Panel Analysis in Identifying Asymmetric Information with Optional Unit Provision in Federal Crop Insurance by Shaik, Saleem
 
 










Role of Panel Analysis in Identifying  
Asymmetric Information with  
Optional Unit Provision  

















Dept of Agribusiness and Applied Economics 
Agricultural Experiment Station 
North Dakota State University 
Fargo, ND 58105-5636  
Acknowledgments 
 
The author extends appreciation to Mr. Tim Petry, Mr. Andrew Swenson and Mr. Cole 
Gustafson for their constructive comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Edie Watts who 
helped prepare the document. 
 
This publication is available electronically at this web site: http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/. 
Please address your inquiries regarding this publication to: Department of Agribusiness & 
Applied Economics, P.O. Box 6050, Fargo, ND, 58108-6050, Phone: 701-231-7334, Fax: 701-









































  Copyright  © 2009 by Shaik. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of 
this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided this copyright notice 
appears on all such copies. 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ii 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1 
Two-way Random Effects Error Decomposition and Potential Moral 
 Hazard/Adverse  Selection  ..................................................................................................  2 
  Monte Carlo Analysis to Address the Effects of Number of Units on Yield Variation .......... 9 
  Steps Involved in the Monte Carlo Analysis ......................................................................... 10 
 
Ordered Probit Model to Examine Asymmetric Information ...................................................... 10 
 
U.S. Cotton Data .......................................................................................................................... 12 
 
Empirical Application and Results .............................................................................................. 12 
 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 16 
 
References .................................................................................................................................... 19 
 














List of Tables 
Tables  Page 
  1.  Decomposition of Risk for an Ideal Case of Optimal Yield Switching Without  
Adverse Selection ....................................................................................................... 6 
 
  2.  Decomposition of Risk for an Ideal Case of Optimal Yield Switching With  
    Adverse  Selection  ........................................................................................................  7 
 
  3.  Shares of Temporal, Spatial and Residual Variance (or Risk) ......................................... 8 
 
 4.  Definitions  of  Variables  Used in the Analysis ............................................................... 13 
 
  5.  Mean of the Variables Used in the Analysis by Number of Optional Units .................. 14 
 
    6.  Regression Results of Ordered Probit Model with Actual and Normalized Spatial,  
      Temporal  and  Residual  Risk  ....................................................................................  17 
 





























This paper has a two-fold contribution, first we demonstrate the relationship of spatial, 
temporal and residual yield risk estimated from a two-way panel random effects model to 
asymmetric information with an optional unit provision in the federal crop insurance program.  
Second, the yield risk components are incorporated in a discrete choice model to examine the 
presence of asymmetric information due to potential yield switching with optional unit 
provisions.  Empirical application to 1998 U.S. cotton crop insurance data reveals the presence 
of asymmetric information with optional unit provisions. 
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The crop insurance program in the U.S. administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Risk Management Agency (RMA) for Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, provides an umbrella 
of protection for farmers against crop loss due to natural disasters, including drought, excessive 
moisture and unusually hot weather.  Unlike other insurance policies, federal crop insurance is a 
unique public-private product sold and serviced by 17 private insurance companies with 1.14 
million policies sold to agricultural producers in 2008.  Currently the federal crop insurance 
program covers 271 million acres spread across 100 plus commodities with over $67.35 billion 
coverage under 22 existing crop insurance plans (for more details see http://www.rma.usda.gov). 
Even though it is largely seen as an effective risk management tool for the producer, from the 
time of its inception this unique public-private
1 federal crop insurance program has been faced 
with higher then desired loss ratios (indemnities/premiums) and lower than desired participation.  
The higher than desired loss ratios have been attributed in part to adverse selection
2 as a result of 
information asymmetries, that is, a situation in which a producer has more information about his 
or her risk of loss than does the insurance provider. 
With the introduction of the optional unit provision in the 1980s, farms that satisfy certain spatial 
requirements
3 are allowed to insure and collect indemnities separately on each unit.  The optional 
unit provision is popular with producers due to its relatively low cost and ability to insure 
separate sections of land.  However, since the current system relies heavily, although not totally, 
upon self-reported but verified yields, there is the potential for moral hazard.  Producers can 
potentially manipulate their optional unit’s yields by switching yields between units and increase 
claim payments.  This kind of moral hazard with optional unit provisions is different from the 
traditional moral hazard (hidden action), defined as the ability of the producer to increase his or 
her expected indemnities by actions taken after buying insurance.  Further, in the context of 
optional unit provisions, adverse selection (hidden temporal and spatial incentives) is a situation 
in which a producer has more temporal and spatial information about his or her risk of 
production (not loss) than does the insurance provider.  Optional unit provisions, as will be 
demonstrated later in the paper, are prone to potential moral hazard and adverse selection leading 
to higher indemnity payments.  Furthermore, higher than desired loss-cost ratios 
(indemnities/liabilities) and loss ratios due to potential moral hazard (see USDA, OIG reports in 
1994 and 1999, and US, GAO report in 1999) and adverse selection were observed for farms 
insuring as optional units
4. 
Issues of adverse selection (see Stilgtiz, 1977; Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Bernard Salanie, 
2000; Bev Dahlby, 1983; and Georges Dionne and Neil A. Doherty, 1994) and traditional moral 
hazard (Mark V. Pauly, 1974; Michael D. Whinston, 1983; Marcel Boyer and Dionne, 1989; and 
Richard J. Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988) have been addressed in the literature.  Recently there has 
been increased focus on the identification and empirical examination of  
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insurance fraud (see the chapters by Pierre Picard; and Georges Dionne from the Handbook of 
Insurance, 2000; September issue of Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2002; and 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/Research_reports.pdf) in the literature.  In crop 
insurance, potential fraudulent or exploitive activities like yield switching, changing the structure 
of the farm by reconstituting units; changing the types of insurance, coverage levels or unit 
types; and dropping in and out of the program over time has also received attention (see USDA, 
OIG reports in 1994 and 1999, and US, GAO report in 1999). 
In this study focusing on optional unit provisions in the federal crop insurance program, first 
demonstrate the relation of orthogonal error decomposition of the two-way random effects panel 
model to potential moral hazard and adverse selection.  Specifically, using cross-sectional unit
5 
yields over time, farm yield variance decomposed into temporal, spatial, and residual variance 
provides information with respect to potential adverse selection and moral hazard (details 
below).  Secondly, the decomposed components reflecting yield risk measures form the basis to 
examine the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection in the RMA insured pool 
while incorporating information with respect to the producer perceived risk of their farm as 
revealed by the number of units insured. 
The role of spatial, temporal and residual components of the two-way random effects panel 
model and their relationship to potential adverse selection and moral hazard is presented in 
section II, followed by the expected utility model of asymmetric information in section III.  
Discrete choice procedures to examine the presence and importance of potential moral hazard 
and adverse selection using RMA 1998 cotton yield data are detailed in section IV.  We conclude 
with results and conclusions in sections V and VI. 
II. Two-way random effects error decomposition and potential moral hazard/adverse 
selection 
Role of temporal moments of yield, price and loss distributions has been the basis in the 
development of earlier and new insurance policies, estimation of demand for insurance policies, 
examining the presence of asymmetric information, and in the establishment of premium rates 
for different insurance policies for crops and livestock.  For example, expected returns to 
insurance (or more specifically temporal yield risk measures) form the basis for examining the 
demand for crop yield insurance.  Similarly, measures of temporal yield and price risk and their 
interaction risk form the basis in estimating the demand for revenue insurance relative to yield or 
no insurance and examining the presence of adverse selection.  To estimate the demand for 
coverage levels, apart from temporal yield risk measures, the subsidy provided by RMA could 
play a role.  Similarly in the development of new insurance products and establishment of 
actuarially sound premium rates, the focus has been on the temporal moments and accounting for 
spatial variation in an ad hoc fashion.  Seldom was there a need for the explicit use of spatial risk 
measures in addition to temporal risk measures in the federal crop insurance program. 
However, the introduction of optional unit provisions provides panel data, i.e. cross sectional 
unit level yields over time for each farm or policy.  This allows the use of spatial along with 
temporal moments of yield, price, and loss distributions in the development of new insurance 
policies, estimation of demand, premium rates, and more importantly potential moral hazard and  
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adverse selection.  Panel data rather than just cross-sectional or just time-series data would form 
the basis for estimating the demand for optional unit insurance, and examining the presence of 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection
6.  Chiappori and Salanie (2000b) suggested, “In 
practice, the distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard may be crucial, especially 
from a normative viewpoint.  But it is also very difficult to implement empirically, especially with 
cross sectional data”.  Hence, panel data allows the differentiation of overall farm yield risk into 
measures of spatial, temporal, and the residual yield risk components that can be identified with 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional units.  For single-unit farms, the 
overall farm yield risk is identified with temporal risk, while the overall farm risk could be 
identified with spatial, temporal, and residual risk components for multiple-unit farms. 
To help us understand this relationship let us define the panel yield for farm f with optional units 
in vector form as: 
(1)  Y
      
where Y  represents a 1×S T matrix;   represents a k×ST matrix of k exogenous time trend 
variable (
1  ,
2  and 
3  ) with S and T representing the spatial (cross-section) and temporal 
(time series) dimension;  ,     are the associated parameters to be estimated with   
representing the degree of polynomial for each of f = 1, 2, ... ,F farms. 
Here the focus is on the additive errors of the two-way error components structure as it 
allows the estimation, testing the degree of polynomial trend and decomposition of overall risk 
into spatial, temporal and residual risk components.  This can be represented in vector form as: 
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S I  and  T I  ( S   and  T  ) represent an identity matrix (vector of ones) of dimensions S and T , 
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To obtain the spatial, temporal and residual components, using an unbalanced panel data for each 
farm with a maximum of nine years of data, equation (1) is estimated and tested for the presence 
of linear or no trend.  For a no trend fit, the two-way random effects panel model as defined in 
equation (1) allows the orthogonal decomposition of error into three iid components – one 
component associated with time, another associated with the cross-sectional units, and the third 
varying in both dimensions.  With optional unit provisions, producer’s risk reflected by overall 
farm yield risk can be decomposed into: 1) temporal risk, identified with potential adverse 
selection, 2) spatial risk, identified with potential adverse selection and moral hazard, and 3) 
residual risk, identified with potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to possible 
potential fraudulent yield switching.  The decomposed variances estimated from equation (1) can 
also be computed for a no trend farm as: 
(4) 
11 1 1 22 2 2 () ( ) ( ) ( )
Total Farm Spatial Temporal Residual
Variance Variance Variance Variance
yy y y y y yy y y st s t st s t ST S ST T ss s tt t
ST R
yy y y   




where T is time and S is the number of optional units within a farm,  , s t y  is the yield for 
optional unit s at time t ,  s y  is the mean of unit s,  yt  is the mean of period t , and  y  is the 
overall mean. 
To illustrate the relationship between potential moral hazard with optional unit provision and 
residual risk, we assume a nine-unit farm.  Table 1 presents yield information for a nine-unit 
farm over time that represents a farm that is committing potential fraudulent yield switching.  
Under the assumption that a producer is committing fraudulent yield switching, the optimal 
behavior would be to report 1000 pounds of cotton yield on any three of the nine units (for 
example the first, fourth, and seventh units) and zero on the remaining six units in a year.  
Continue this behavior next year by reporting 1000 pounds of cotton yield on the second, fifth, 
and eight units, and zero yields on the remaining six units, and so on.  This would allow the 
producer to maintain his or her average yield and premium rates on each unit, but at the same 
time trigger maximum indemnity payments on individual units sequentially each year.  The 
cross-section unit-level yields over time are used to estimate the temporal, spatial, and residual 
variance from equation (1) or constructed from equation (4) with no trend.  Under optimal yield 
switching, results from Table 1 show that 100% of farm variance is explained by the residual, as 
the variation across units and within each unit over time is zero.  For any kind of multivariate 
normally distributed unit yields over time, we would expect the overall farm variance to be 
shared across temporal, spatial, and residual components.  Hence, when optimal yield switching 
behavior occurs we would expect 100% of yield variation to be explained by the residual. 
Next, redistributed yields presented in Table 2, illustrates the relationship of potential moral 
hazard and adverse selection to spatial, temporal, and residual risk.  The overall production on  
5 
 
the farm is no different from Table 1, but the yields are redistributed not only to reflect moral 
hazard but also the presence of adverse selection, i.e., the producer has more information 
compared to the insurance provider about the heterogeneous risks (varying standard deviation) 
across units within a farm due to optional unit provision.  The panel structure of the yield data is 
used to estimate the temporal, spatial, and residual variance as defined in equation (1) or 
constructed from equation (4).  Results from Table 2 show that 98% of overall farm variance is 
explained by residual variance and 1% each by temporal and spatial variance.  The difference of 
2% reflected in the temporal and spatial variance share is due to adverse selection and/or moral 
hazard. 
Table 3 presents the shares of temporal, spatial, and residual risk components computed from 
panel data for a single-unit farm up to nine-unit farms.  Furthermore, the temporal, spatial, and 
residual shares for farm with four years up to nine years of panel data is also presented in Table 
3.  Shares instead of variance are presented and utilized in the analysis to provide unitless 
measures of temporal, spatial, and residual risk. 
Based on the trends in the spatial, temporal, and residual shares, it is expected the temporal 
(spatial and residual) risk component to decrease (increase) with an increase in the number of 
units from one to nine.  In contrast, the temporal (spatial and residual) risk component will 
increase (decrease) with an increase in the number of years of data from four to nine.  However, 
these trends might actually reflect the true yield variation across units within a farm.  To identify 
the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional unit provision, the 
influence of true yield variation and the number of units within a farm needs to be accounted.  
One approach would be to normalize the individual farm risk components by dividing them by 
the average of Monte Carlo simulated risk components computed from a representative or 
normal farm’s yield distribution.  With the use of normalized risk components i.e., risk 
components over and above the representative or normal farm’s yield distribution, the positive 
and significant coefficients of spatial, temporal, and residual shares indicate the presence of 












Table 1.  Decomposition of Risk for an Ideal Case of Optimal Yield Switching without Adverse Selection 
Temporal, Spatial and Residual Variance
Year Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 7 Unit 8 Unit 9 mean Std
1990 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 333.33 500.00
1991 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 333.33 500.00
1992 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 333.33 500.00
1993 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 333.33 500.00
1994 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 333.33 500.00
1995 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 333.33 500.00
1996 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 333.33 500.00
1997 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 333.33 500.00
1998 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 333.33 500.00
mean 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33 333.33
std 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00
Risk Spatial Temporal Residual









Table 2.  Decomposition of Risk for an Ideal Case of Optimal Yield Switching with Adverse Selection 
Temporal and Spatial Variance
Year Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 7 Unit 8 Unit 9 mean Std
1990 1000 0 0 1500 0 0 500 0 0 333.33 559.02
1991 0 1000 0 0 1500 0 0 500 0 333.33 559.02
1992 0 0 1500 0 0 1000 0 0 500 333.33 559.02
1993 1500 0 0 1000 0 0 1500 0 0 444.44 682.11
1994 0 1500 0 0 1500 0 0 1000 0 444.44 682.11
1995 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 333.33 500.00
1996 500 0 0 1500 0 0 500 0 0 277.78 506.90
1997 0 500 0 0 1000 0 0 500 0 222.22 363.24
1998 0 0 500 0 0 1000 0 0 1000 277.78 440.96
mean 333.33 333.33 333.33 444.44 444.44 333.33 277.78 222.22 277.78
std 559.02 559.02 559.02 682.11 682.11 500.00 506.90 363.24 440.96
Risk Spatial Temporal Residual
Variance 4,801 4,801 567,901








Table 3.  Shares of Temporal, Spatial and Residual Variance (or Risk)  
             
Number 
of Units 
Effect of Number of Units  Effect of Number of Years 
Temporal Spatial Residual Temporal Spatial  Residual
    
1 1  0 0        
2 0.632  0.137 0.231        
3 0.547  0.182 0.271        
4 0.502  0.210 0.288 0.6472 0.1614  0.1914
5  0.482 0.217 0.301 0.7379 0.1127 0.1494
6 0.454  0.250 0.296 0.7183 0.1138  0.1679
7 0.437  0.257 0.307 0.8010 0.0740  0.1250
8 0.416  0.274 0.310 0.8045 0.0697  0.1258








II a. Monte Carlo analysis to address the effects of number of units on yield variation 
Monte Carlo analysis is used to examine the effect of number of units on the share of 
spatial, temporal, and residual risk components.  Nine years of yield data are generated for a 
single-unit up to nine-unit farm based on the mean yield and variance-covariance yield matrix of 
a representative farm.  For a single farm f , with multiple units the vector of mean and variance-


























where  is the vector of unit level mean yields based on unit 1 yields,  1 y  to unit N yields, N y  
time with N representing the total number of units within each farm,  f ; and  is the 
corresponding variance-covariance matrix of mean   for each farm,  f .  The variance-
covariance matrix and mean yield for each farm is computed from the RMA yield history file 
based on actual yields reported by the producer for single-unit farm to a maximum of nine-unit 
farm. 
The representative farm’s mean, 
f   and variance-covariance matrix, 
f   is computed as 






















where f = 1, 2, ..., F number of farms in each of the single-unit to nine-unit farm. 
This representative farm mean and variance-covariance matrix is used to generate the 20,000 
samples with nine years of yield data for a single-unit farm, two-unit farm and so forth up to 
nine-unit farm based on multivariate normal distribution with replacement.  The multivariate 
normal yield data is generated using the Cholesky root of the variance-covariance matrix.  The 
panel structure of the generated data is used to estimate the temporal, spatial, and residual 
variance as defined in equation (1) or equation (4) for 20,000 samples.  These variances are used 
in the computation of average Monte Carlo temporal, spatial, and residual shares.  
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II b. Steps involved in the Monte Carlo Analysis 
Step 1  Each farm’s mean and variance-covariance matrix are estimated. 
Step 2  Representative farm’s mean and variance-covariance matrix is computed as the average 
of all the farms by state and practice for a single-unit up to nine-unit farm and within each farm 
2-years up to 9-years of data. 
Step 3  This representative farm’s mean and variance-covariance matrix is used to generate the 
20,000 samples for a single-unit, two-unit, and so forth up to nine-unit farm based on 
multivariate normal distribution. 
Step 4  Similarly, representative farm’s mean and variance-covariance matrix is used to generate 
the 20,000 samples for a farm with four years of data, five years of data, and so forth up to nine-
years of farm data based on multivariate normal distribution. 
Step 5  The MC simulated data is used to estimate the temporal, spatial, and residual variance as 
defined in equation (1) for 20,000 samples. 
Step 6  The variances are then used in the computation of average Monte Carlo temporal, spatial, 
and residual shares for single-unit to nine-unit farm and four-year to nine-year panel data. 
These components form the basis for examining the presence of potential moral hazard and 
adverse selection (identified with spatial, temporal, and residual risk components) by the 
producer decision to insure as a single or multiple-unit farm due to optional unit provisions in 
federal crop insurance program.  Two discrete choice models are estimated, model 1 used the 
spatial, temporal, and residual risk components while model 2 used the normalized spatial, 
temporal, and residual risk component shares.  The signs on the spatial, temporal, and residual 
risk components in model 2 are expected to be positive and significant indicating the presence of 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional unit provisions.  While negative 
(positive) is expected on the temporal (spatial and residual) risk components in model 1. 
III. Ordered probit model to examine asymmetric information  
In this section, an asymmetric information model incorporating the spatial, temporal, and 
residual risk components to examine the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection due to 
optional unit provisions is developed.  A multinomial discrete choice model of number of 
optional units insured by a farm or policy is developed. 




































where the choice,  j  is equal to zero for farms with one optional unit, 1 for farms with two 
optional unit and 8 for farms with nine or more optional units. 
The probability of the ordered discrete choice to insure number of optional units defined in 
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          
where 
'
i x     is the cumulative normal function,  's  is the threshold values, and i is the 
number of observations used in the analysis.  Since the probabilities sum to one, it is possible to 
set one (farms with one optional unit) of the parameter vectors equal to zero. 
The coefficients of the ordered probit model defined in the probability is used to compute the 
marginal effects by differentiating equation (10) for each of the nine choices by independent 
variables.  The marginal effects can be readily used in the interpretation of the results and 
defined as: 
(11)









    
       
Here the exogenous variables includes the four moments of the yield distribution -- first moment, 
temporal, spatial, and residual risk or second moments respectively, third moment or skewness,  and the fourth moment or kurtosis.  The other exogenous variables include average acreage of 
the farm, crop insurance premium rate, number of actual yields reported by the producer, dummy 
for irrigated acreage, and dummy for farms with more than 640 acres.  For the second model, all  
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the variables remain the same except the second moments of the yield distribution is normalized 
by the representative farm’s second moments. 
IV. U.S. cotton data 
Information on each producer who purchased cotton insurance for the year 1998 is extracted 
from RMA’s data files
7.  The producers were restricted to those who purchased additional 
coverage i.e., buyup policies under yield insurance.  Information on the number of units insured 
within a farm is computed from the yield history data.  In the yield history file, each producer at 
the time of purchasing insurance is required to submit self-reported but verified yield and 
acreage data for the last 6-10 years of actual data.  These 6-10 years of unit level yield and 
acreage information within a farm represents the cross-sectional time-series data.  Each 
producer’s farm yield risk decomposed into temporal, spatial, and residual risks is estimated 
using a two-way random effects panel model defined in equation (1) or computed using equation 
(4) for each farm.  The average acreage is used to account for any changes in the acreage over 
time for each farm.  For each of the unit yield observation over time, the multiple peril crop 
insurance rates published by RMA are extracted to form the premium rate.  Information on other 
exogenous variables available for the yield history file are obtained from RMA and used in the 
analysis. 
The dependent and independent variables are defined in Table 4.  The number of insured cotton 
farms and the arithmetic mean of variables used in the analysis by number of units insured within 
a farm are presented in Table 5.  The number of farms seems to indicate a decreasing trend with 
units, with 15,585 farms insured as a single-unit farm compared to 10,171 multiple-unit farms.  
The mean of the temporal risk (spatial and residual) is higher (lower) for a single-unit farm and 
decreases (increases) with the number of units.  The mean temporal and spatial normalized 
shares portray similar trend, i.e., the normalized temporal (spatial) shares decrease (increase) 
with the number of units insured.  The means of other variables used in the analysis are also 
presented. 
V. Empirical application and results 
To examine the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to the optional unit 
provision, an empirical application of the producer decision to insure a single-unit farm, two-unit 
farm and up to 9 or more-unit farm is modeled for all the U.S. producers who purchased cotton 
insurance for the year 1998 using RMA’s yield database.  An ordered probit model is estimated 
with the number of optional units (Optional Units) insured within a farm policy as the dependent 
variable coded as 0 through 8, where 0 corresponds to a single-unit farm and 8 corresponds to a 
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where i is the number of observations or farms,  y   is the first moment of yield distribution,  
,
TS R
yy y and   are the temporal, spatial, and residual second moment of yield distribution 
respectively,  1  is the third moment of yield distribution or skewness, and  2  the fourth 
moment of yield distribution or kurtosis
8.  The other exogenous variables include fsizeis the 
average acreage of the farm,  p is the crop insurance premium rate, actuals is the number of 
actual yields reported by the producer, irr  is the dummy for irrigated acreage,  640 A is the 
dummy for farms with more than 640 acres,  1,i   is an error term and  
2
1,i   is the variance of 
disturbance term,  1,i  .
  Table 4.  Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis 
    
Variable Units  Definitions 
    
    
Number of units  Number  Number of units insured within a farm policy 
Mean yield  Pounds  Mean of yield 
Temporal yield risk  Pounds  Yield variation over time 
Spatial yield risk  Pounds  Yield variation across units 
Residual yield risk  Pounds  Remaining residual yield variation across 
units and over time 
Normalized temporal 
yield risk  Ratio  Temporal variation over the representative 
farm temporal variation 
Normalized spatial 
yield risk  Ratio  Spatial variation over the representative farm 
spatial variation 
Normalized residual 
yield risk  Ratio  Residual variation over the representative 
farm residual variation 
Skewness Value  Skewness, a measure of symmetry relative to 
a normal distribution 
Kurtosis Value  Kurtosis, a measure of whether the data are 
peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. 
Acreage  Acres  Average acreage of the farm 
Premium Percentage  Yield based premiums rates published by 
RMA 
Number of actuals  Dummy  Number of actual yields reported < 4 and > 4 
are coded as 0 and 1 respectively 
Irrigated Dummy  If  irrigated  then Dummy is coded as 1 
Acres more than 640  Dummy  If acreage > 640 acres then A640 is coded as 1 




Table 5.  Mean of the variables Used in the Analysis by Number of Optional Units 
Units  1 2 3 4  5 6
                       
Number of farms    15585 4836 2132 1257 748 485
Mean yield  Pounds  414.6 424.3 457.8 462.1 451.3 475.9
Temporal yield risk  Pounds  188.8 175.4 172.6 166.7 164.7 159.9
Spatial yield risk  Pounds  0.0 38.0 57.4 69.7 74.1 88.3
Residual yield risk  Pounds  0.0 64.0 85.6 95.8 102.8 104.4
Normalized temporal risk  Ratio  1.000 0.854 0.766 0.660 0.729 0.660
Normalized spatial risk  Ratio  0.000 2.052 2.447 3.546 2.440 2.511
Normalized residual risk  Ratio  0.000 1.288 1.380 1.757 1.259 1.478
Skewness Pounds  -0.198 -0.161 -0.153 -0.148 -0.105 -0.138
Kurtosis Pounds  0.147 0.170 0.135 0.149 0.127 0.200
Acreage Acres  125.7 134.9 134.7 130.4 125.8 123.9
Premium Percentage 0.172 0.173 0.169 0.162 0.162 0.164
Number of actuals  Dummy  0.887 0.813 0.709 0.710 0.672 0.581
Irrigated Dummy  0.369 0.384 0.385 0.383 0.332 0.280
Acres more than 640  Dummy  0.006 0.048 0.134 0.240 0.318 0.402
                       
Notation  7 8 9    1 >=2
Number of farms  314 232 167    15,585 10,171
Mean yield  y  497.7 498.5 516.7    415 473
Temporal yield risk 
T
y    163.8 162.2 156.1    189 165
Spatial yield risk 
S
y    96.2 106.8 112.4    0 80
Residual yield risk 
R
y    115.1 121.1 125.6    0 102
Normalized temporal risk 
T
y N   0.648 0.641 0.583    1.000 0.692
Normalized spatial risk 
S
y N   2.853 2.649 2.741    0.000 2.655
Normalized residual risk 
R
y N   1.348 1.290 1.486    0.000 1.411
Skewness  1    -0.183 -0.071 0.088    -0.198 -0.109
Kurtosis  2    0.118 0.141 0.057    0.147 0.137
Acreage  fsize 122.1 119.0 95.1    126 123
Premium  p 0.144 0.148 0.145    0.172 0.158
Number of actuals  actuals   0.522 0.496 0.479    0.887 0.623
Irrigated  irr   0.258 0.241 0.186    0.369 0.306
Acres more than 640  640 A   0.468 0.440 0.401    0.006 0.306




Results from the two ordered probit models (equation 11) with first, temporal, spatial, and 
residual, second (normalized temporal, spatial, and residual second), third, and fourth moments 
of yield, premiums rates, farm size, number of actual yield reported, dummy for irrigated 
acreage, and dummy for farm with more than 640 acres are reported in Table 6.  The difference 
between the two models stems from the use of temporal, spatial, and residual, second moments 
in Model 1 compared to the use of normalized temporal, spatial, and residual, second moments in 
Model 2 to examine the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Based on the trend in the shares reported in Table 3, results from Model 1 indicate the parameter 
estimates on the temporal (spatial and residual) risk components are negative (positive) and 
significantly related to the number of optional units insured within a farm policy.  To examine 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to an optional unit provision in federal crop 
insurance, we focus on the results from Model 2 in Table 6.  The three yield risks in Model 2 are 
normalized shares i.e., shares over and above the representative or normal farm’s yield 
distribution.  A positive parameter estimate of spatial, temporal, and residual shares, ceterus 
paribus, would be an indicator of potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional 
unit provision.  Model 2 results with positive and significant parameter estimates of residual, 
temporal, and spatial support the presence of potential moral hazard (spatial and residual) and 
adverse selection (temporal and spatial) with optional unit provisions in federal crop insurance.  
Mean yield, a measure of individual farm productivity, was negative and significantly correlated 
with the number of optional units in Model 1.  This indicates producers with higher average 
yields tend to insure as a single-unit farm.  However, it is positive and significant in Model 2 
indicating producers with a higher mean yield at farms are insuring as a multiple-unit farm to 
address the spatial mean yield difference across units within a farm.  As expected, farms with 
extreme events and thickness of the tails reflected by the measures of skewness and kurtosis of 
yield respectively indicate a positive and significant relationship with the number of optional 
units.  Farms with higher than average acreage or farm size tend to insure as single-unit farm.  
Similarly, if the premium rate is higher, the producers are more inclined to insure as a single-unit 
farm.  The remaining variables, number of actual yields reported, practice dummy for irrigated 
acreage, and farms with more than 640 acres exhibit the expected negative, negative and positive 
parameter estimates, respectively.  Producers with a higher number of actual yields reported tend 
to insure as single-unit farm as they do have anything to hide with respect to the yields or not 
leaning towards the use of assigned yields.  Irrigated producers tend to insure as single-unit 
farms as the yields are higher and variation is lower for farms with irrigation. 
The variance function variables mean yield, acreage, and premium exhibit positive, negative and 
positive results, respectively.  Producers with higher mean yield and premium are faced with a 
larger variance of the errors despite accounting for the four moments of the yield distribution.  In 
contrast, farms with a higher average acreage or farm size have lower error variance. 
Next, the marginal effects of the normalized spatial, temporal, and residual risk from Model 2 
reflecting potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional unit provision is 
discussed.  The marginal effects of the variables for each of the choices are computed based on 
equation (11) and presented in Table 7.  An examination of the marginal effect indicates that as 
the normalized temporal risk is up by one percent, probability of insuring as single-unit farm is  
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expected to decrease by 2.24 percent.  In contrast, if the normalized temporal risk is up by one 
percent, probability of insuring as a two-unit farm, three-unit farm, four-unit farm, and so forth 
up to 9 or more optional unit farm is expected to increase by 2.00, 0.19, 0.036, and 0.0001 
percent respectively.  The normalized spatial and residual risk also indicate a declining trend in 
the probabilities of insuring as a two-unit farm, three-unit farm, four-unit farm, and so forth up to 
9 or more optional unit farm.  This indicates the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse 
selection is highest with farms insured as a two-unit farm and declines with an increase in the 
number of optional units. 
VI. Conclusions 
Using orthogonal error decomposition of the two-way random effects panel model, 
measures of temporal, spatial, and residual risk components are developed that correspond to the 
presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection.  The decomposed components form the 
basis for examining the presence of potential moral hazard and adverse selection using a discrete 
choice ordered probit model.  Second, the normalized (over and above the representative farm 
variation) temporal, spatial, and residual supports potential moral hazard and adverse selection 
due to optional unit provisions in the crop insurance program.  However, the extent of the 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to optional unit provisions need to be quantified 
using actual loss data. 
Apart from statistically differentiating moral hazard and adverse selection, the 
implications of the research would form the basis for (1) streamlining the premium rate discounts 
for optional units to maintain actuarial standards, and (2) providing alternative statistical 
measures to identify potential moral hazard and adverse selection due to potential fraudulent 









Table 6.  Regression Results of Ordered Probit Model with Actual and Normalized  
       Spatial, Temporal and Residual Risk 
Model 1     Model 2 
Variables  Parameter 
Coefficients  P[|Z|>z]   Variables  Parameter 
Coefficients  P[|Z|>z]
                
Index function for probability of number of optional units  
Intercept 1.1207  <  0.00     Intercept -7.9210  <  0.00 
Mean Yield  -0.0008  < 0.00     Mean yield  0.0004  < 0.00 
Temporal 
Risk  -0.0055 <  0.00    Normalized 
temporal risk  7.0798 <  0.00 
Spatial Risk  0.0043  < 0.00     Normalized 
spatial risk  0.7546 <  0.00 
Residual 
Risk  0.0314 <  0.00    Normalized 
residual risk  2.4548 <  0.00 
Skewness 0.0069  0.32    Skewness  0.0002  < 0.00 
Kurtosis 0.0007  <  0.00     Kurtosis  0.0005  < 0.00 
Acreage -0.0016  <  0.00     Acreage  -0.0029  < 0.00 
Premium -1.2698  <  0.00     Premium  -0.6232  < 0.00 
Number of 
actuals  -0.9501 <  0.00    Number of 
actuals  -0.8921 <  0.00 
Irrigated -0.4245  <  0.00     Irrigated  -0.3134  < 0.00 
Acres more 
than 640  2.3223 <  0.00    Acres more 
than 640  2.1253 <  0.00 
Variance function  
Mean yield  0.0007  < 0.00     Mean yield  0.0003  < 0.00 
Acreage -0.0003  <  0.00     Acreage  -0.0003  < 0.00 
Premium 0.6879  <  0.00     Premium  0.3600  < 0.00 
  
Threshold parameters for index  
LIMIT1 1.7819  <  0.00     LIMIT1 2.0282  <  0.00 
LIMIT2 2.8018  <  0.00     LIMIT2 2.7595  <  0.00 
LIMIT3 3.6233  <  0.00    LIMIT3 3.2474  <  0.00 
LIMIT4 4.3144  <  0.00    LIMIT4 3.5915  <  0.00 
LIMIT5 4.9670  <  0.00    LIMIT5 3.9226  <  0.00 
LIMIT6 5.6041  <  0.00    LIMIT6 4.2424  <  0.00 
LIMIT7 6.4086  <  0.00    LIMIT7 4.6646  <  0.00  
 
 
Table 7.  Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables on Number of Optional Units 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9
               
Mean yield  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Normalized temporal risk  -2.2403 2.0043 0.1866 0.0355 0.0088  0.0033 0.0012 0.0005 0.0001
Normalized spatial risk  -0.2388 0.2136 0.0199 0.0038 0.0009  0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Normalized residual risk  -0.7768 0.6950 0.0647 0.0123 0.0031  0.0012 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
Skewness  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kurtosis  -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Acreage  0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Premium  0.1972 -0.1764 -0.0164 -0.0031 -0.0008  -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Number of actuals  0.2823 -0.2525 -0.0235 -0.0045 -0.0011  -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
Irrigated  0.0992 -0.0887 -0.0083 -0.0016 -0.0004  -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Acres more than 640  -0.6725 0.6017 0.0560 0.0107 0.0027  0.0010 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000
        
Mean yield  1.1927 -0.5315 -0.4822 -0.1208 -0.0348  -0.0145 -0.0057 -0.0025 -0.0008
Acreage  -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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1 Due to the unique public-private partnership, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation through U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Risk Management Agency provides reinsurance (subsidy) to approved commercial insurers, which 
insure agricultural commodities using FCIC-approved acceptable plans through standard reinsurance agreement 
(SRA).  With SRA, the crop insurance sold and serviced through private insurance companies receives subsidies on 
a portion of the premium, administrative and operating expenses by the federal government.  The three available 
SRAs’ - Standard Reinsurance Agreement, the Livestock Price Reinsurance Agreement, and the Aquatic Crop 
Reinsurance Agreement are considered cooperative financial assistance agreements between the FCIC and the 
insurance company named on the agreement.  Since 1998, the private insurance companies reinsured by FCIC have 
sold and serviced all multiple peril crop insurance authorized under the Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
 
2 Under RMA’s current procedures, producers have the option to a) insure or not insure; b) choose the level of 
insurance coverage; c) choose yield or revenue insurance product; and d) basic or optional unit based on his/her 
perceived risk in order to maximize profits each crop year.  Shaik and Atwood, 2002, have examined the presence of 
adverse selection due to above choice of insurance policy. 
 
3 Subdivision of the farm into optional units is allowed for land in different sections under rectangular survey, and 
for irrigated versus dryland production.  A section is one square mile (or 640 acres) and where legal descriptions are 
not based on rectangular survey, alternative criteria such as Farm Agency Service farm serial number and non-
contiguity are used to define insurable units.  For details see pp 36-44 under section 4 of the 2002 Crop Insurance 
Handbook (APH), Issued: 06/2001 and available at the following website 
http://www.rma.usda.gov/FTP/Publications/directives/18000/pdf/02_18010.pdf. 
 
4 The current yield, revenue and area insurance policies offer the producers the choice to insure optional, basic, 
enterprise and whole farm unit.  A unit is defined as that acreage of the insured crop in the county, which is taken 
into consideration when determining the guarantee, premium, and the amount of any indemnity (loss payment) for 
that acreage.  The basic insurance unit is all insurable acreage of the insured crop in the county on the date coverage 
begins for the crop year in which the producer has a 100 percent share or which is owned by one entity and operated 
by another specific entity on a share basis.  Basic units may be further divided into optional units.  Optional units are 
determined by section, section equivalents, FSA Farm Serial Number, noncontiguous land (for certain perennial 
crops), and irrigated and non-irrigated practices.  When the policy allows, optional units may be established, 
provided the crop is planted in a manner that results in a clear and discernible break in the planting pattern at the 
boundaries of each optional unit, and the producer keeps separate identifiable records of planted acreage and 
harvested production for each optional unit.  An enterprise unit includes all insurable acres of a single crop in a 
county.  A whole-farm unit includes all insurable acres of all crops in a county. 
 
5  Since we are addressing the issue of moral hazard due to potential yield switching it does not matter if the unit is a 
basic, optional, enterprise unit within a farm policy. 
 
6 Issues of adverse selection (see Stilgtiz, 1977; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Bev Dahlby, 1983; and Dionne and 
Doherty, 1994) and traditional moral hazard (Pauly, 1974; Whinston, 1983; Boyer and Dionne, 1989; and Arnott 
and Stiglitz, 1988) have been addressed in the literature.  Recently there has been increased focus on the 
identification and empirical examination of insurance fraud (see the chapters by Picard; and Dionne from the 
Handbook of Insurance, 2000; September issue of Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2002; and 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/Research_reports.pdf) in the literature. 
 
7 Risk Management Agency's database consists of a number of different databases containing information with 
respect to insurance companies, agents, adjusters, and producers.  RMA's yield history data set contains producers' 
reported historical yields used in establishing an average or "approved" yield at the beginning of the insurance year.  
RMA's loss history data set collects indemnities paid at the end of the insurance year. 
 
8 Negative values for skewness indicate data are skewed to the left.  Positive values for skewness indicate data are  
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skewed to the right.  The kurtosis for a standard normal distribution is three and for this reason kurtosis is defined as
2 (3 )   .  A positive value for kurtosis indicates a peaked distribution, i.e., leptokurtic or thick tailed 
()  2 30   and a negative value of kurtosis indicates a flat distribution, i.e., platykurtic or thin tailed
()  2 30  .  For the analysis, the left or right skewness and thin or thick-tailed kurtosis is not differentiated. 